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Ask Stoics source guide · Stoicism and Emotions

Stoicism and Jealousy

Examine possession, fear of loss, comparison, and the conduct a relationship actually asks of you.

On this page you will get a clear explanation, a way to examine the idea, exact evidence from public-domain Stoic texts, and links for continuing the study.

The central distinction

Examine possession, fear of loss, comparison, and the conduct a relationship actually asks of you.

The relevant primary texts approach this through Seneca, On Anger, Epictetus, Discourses, and Cicero, On Ends. Read the excerpts as parts of arguments, not as slogans.

How to examine it

Name the event in plain observable language. Then name the judgment, prediction, demand, or appetite added to it.

Separate what belongs to choice—attention, assent, refusal, intention, and action—from another person, the past, chance, and the final outcome.

A practical method

Use Cognitive Distancing: Separate the event from the judgment added to it. The practice supplies a fixed sequence so the idea is tested in experience rather than admired in the abstract.

Claim only the practice and the felt experience of doing it. Do not turn a philosophical exercise into a promise that an emotion, relationship, or circumstance will be cured.

Common confusion

Stoic practice does not require pretending that pain, fear, grief, or anger never appeared. The first movement can arrive before deliberate choice.

The work begins with the use made of that movement: whether it is accepted as a command, enlarged by a story, examined, delayed, or answered with character.

What the primary texts say

These excerpts keep their work and exact locator so you can check the claim in context rather than accepting a detached quotation.

““Anger,” says our opponent, “is useful, because it avoids contempt, and because it frightens bad men.” Now, in the first place, if anger is strong in proportion to its threats, it is hateful for the same reason that it is terrible: and it is more dangerous to be hated than to be despised. If, again, it is without strength, it is much more exposed to contempt, and cannot avoid ridicule; for what is more flat than anger when it breaks out into meaningless ravings? Moreover, because some things are somewhat terrible, they are not on that account desirable: nor does wisdom wish it to be said of the wise man, as it is of a wild beast, that the fear which he inspires is as a weapon to him. Why, do we not fear fever, gout, consuming ulcers? and is there,…”
— Seneca, On Anger 2.11 · Aubrey Stewart translation · Open the public-domain edition
“What a man applies himself to earnestly, that he naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves earnestly to the things which are bad? By no means. Well, do they apply themselves to things which in no way concern themselves? not to these either. It remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only about things which are good; and if they are earnestly employed about things, they love such things also. Whoever then understands what is good, can also know how to love: but he who cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he possess the power of loving? To love then is only in the power of the wise. How is this? a man may say, “I am foolish, and yet I love my child.”⁠—I am surprised indeed that…”
— Epictetus, Discourses 2.22 · George Long translation · Open the public-domain edition
“And this also would be a very absurd thing if any one were to say it, namely, that a man is loved by himself in such a manner that that vehement love is referred to some other thing, and not to that very man who loves himself. Now when this is said in the case of friendship, of duty, or of virtue, however it is said, it is still intelligible what is meant by it; but in regard to our own selves, it cannot even be understood that we should love ourselves for the sake of something else, or in a word, for the sake of pleasure. For it is for our sakes that we love pleasure, and not for the sake of pleasure that we love ourselves; although what can be more evident than that every one is not only dear, but excessively dear to himself? For who is there, or…”
— Cicero, On Ends 5.11 · Charles Duke Yonge translation · Open the public-domain edition