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Desire and Aversion: When Appetite Becomes a Command

In Stoic philosophy, understanding the nature of desire and aversion is crucial for living a tranquil life. Often, what we perceive as a command from our appetites is merely a sensation that, if unexamined, can lead us astray. This page explores how desires, especially those for pleasure, can be misunderstood and how this misunderstanding can impact our judgment and actions. By distinguishing between true good and mere sensation, we can better govern our inner world.

On this page you will get a clear explanation, a way to examine the idea, exact evidence from public-domain Stoic texts, and links for continuing the study.

The Nature of Pleasure

Pleasure is often understood as a sensation that moves the senses and carries an agreeable feeling. This common understanding, however, can obscure a deeper philosophical inquiry into what constitutes true good.

Some philosophers, like Epicurus, define pleasure as the ultimate end to be desired, the very limit of good. Yet, even this view acknowledges that pleasure is not always present or necessary if one is free from pain. This suggests a complex relationship between pleasure and the absence of suffering.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.3; Cicero, On Ends 2.10

Distinguishing True Good from Sensation

A critical aspect of Stoic thought involves discerning what is truly good from what merely feels good. The agreeable sensation of pleasure, while perceptible, does not automatically equate to a genuine good.

If one cannot conceive of any good without pleasure, it indicates a potential misunderstanding of what constitutes a desirable end. True good should be something worth desiring for its own sake, not merely as an absence of pain.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10; Cicero, On Ends 2.3

The Misconception of Pleasure as the Chief Good

Some argue that if pleasure is removed, there is no other remaining thing that can be called good. This perspective elevates sensory pleasure to the highest good, overlooking other potential sources of value.

However, this view can be inconsistent. If pleasure is only desired when one is not in pain, it implies that pleasure itself is not always a primary good, but rather a secondary state dependent on the absence of discomfort.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10

The Role of Definition in Understanding

Clear definitions are essential for philosophical understanding. Without a precise understanding of what pleasure is, and what its character entails, one risks misinterpreting its role in a good life.

A lack of proper division or definition can lead to inconsistencies in one's philosophy. If a concept like pleasure is not clearly defined, its implications for ethics and action can become muddled.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10

Beyond Sensory Pleasure

While sensory pleasure is a common experience, it is not the only form of pleasure, nor is it necessarily the most significant. A broader understanding of pleasure might encompass more dignified and virtuous aspects.

The Stoic approach often seeks to understand a system that is dignified, temperate, and virtuous, even if it is sometimes mischaracterized as voluptuous. This suggests a pursuit of a deeper, more profound sense of well-being.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 1.11

The Impact of Misguided Desire

When desires are mistaken for commands, particularly those rooted in sensory pleasure, they can govern our actions rather than being subject to our reason. This can lead to choices that are not aligned with true good.

Understanding the true nature of pleasure and its limitations helps in cultivating a more rational approach to desires. This allows for a more consistent and virtuous life, free from the inconsistencies of unexamined appetites.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10

What the primary texts say

These excerpts keep their work and exact locator so you can check the claim in context rather than accepting a detached quotation.

“But this he does not see, that it is a great proof that at the very moment when he says that if pleasure be once taken away he has no idea at all what remaining thing can be called good, (and he follows up this assertion with the statement that he means such pleasure as is perceptible by the palate”
— Cicero, On Ends 2.10 · Charles Duke Yonge translation · Open the public-domain edition
“said he. Because all men feel that this is pleasure which moves the senses when they receive it, and which has a certain agreeableness pervading it throughout. What then, said he, is Epicurus ignorant of that kind of pleasure? Not always, I replied; for sometimes he is even too well acquainted with it, inasmuch as he declares that he is”
— Cicero, On Ends 2.3 · Charles Duke Yonge translation · Open the public-domain edition
“For we are not at present pursuing that pleasure alone which moves nature itself by a certain sweetness, and which is perceived by the senses with a certain pleasurable feeling; but we consider that the greatest”
— Cicero, On Ends 1.11 · Charles Duke Yonge translation · Open the public-domain edition

Frequently asked questions

What is the Stoic view on pleasure?

The Stoic view distinguishes between sensory pleasure and true good. While pleasure can be a sensation, it is not considered the chief good or the ultimate end to be desired for its own sake. (cicero-on-ends-2-10, cicero-on-ends-1-11)

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10; Cicero, On Ends 1.11

How can desire become a governing force?

Desire becomes a governing force when it is mistaken for a command, especially when rooted in unexamined sensory appetites. This can lead to actions driven by sensation rather than reasoned judgment.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10

Why is it important to define pleasure clearly?

Clearly defining pleasure is crucial to avoid philosophical inconsistencies. Without a precise understanding of its nature and character, one might mistakenly elevate it to the chief good, leading to misguided pursuits.

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10

What is the difference between pleasure and true good?

Pleasure is often described as a sensation that moves the senses with agreeableness. True good, however, is something worth desiring for its own sake, not merely as an absence of pain or a fleeting sensation. (cicero-on-ends-2-10, cicero-on-ends-2-3)

Sources: Cicero, On Ends 2.10; Cicero, On Ends 2.3

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