AASK STOICSSOURCE LIBRARY · PRACTICE APP Open the App

Ask Stoics source guide · Stoic Virtues

Greatness of Soul in Stoicism

Examine steadiness toward praise, blame, fortune, and responsibility without vanity.

On this page you will get a clear explanation, a way to examine the idea, exact evidence from public-domain Stoic texts, and links for continuing the study.

The central distinction

Examine steadiness toward praise, blame, fortune, and responsibility without vanity.

The relevant primary texts approach this through Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, Cicero, On Ends, and Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius. Read the excerpts as parts of arguments, not as slogans.

How to examine it

Name the event in plain observable language. Then name the judgment, prediction, demand, or appetite added to it.

Separate what belongs to choice—attention, assent, refusal, intention, and action—from another person, the past, chance, and the final outcome.

A practical method

Use Indifference to Reputation: Release the demand to govern another person’s opinion. The practice supplies a fixed sequence so the idea is tested in experience rather than admired in the abstract.

Claim only the practice and the felt experience of doing it. Do not turn a philosophical exercise into a promise that an emotion, relationship, or circumstance will be cured.

Common confusion

Stoic practice does not require pretending that pain, fear, grief, or anger never appeared. The first movement can arrive before deliberate choice.

The work begins with the use made of that movement: whether it is accepted as a command, enlarged by a story, examined, delayed, or answered with character.

What the primary texts say

These excerpts keep their work and exact locator so you can check the claim in context rather than accepting a detached quotation.

“know why that which appears to me to be a most miserable thing, should be no evil. The answer is, that nothing is an evil but what is base and vicious. You return to your trifling, for you do not remove what made me uneasy. I know that pain is not vice,—you need not inform me of that: but show me, that it makes no difference to me whether I am in pain or not. It has never anything to do, say you, with a happy life, for that depends upon virtue alone; but yet pain is to be avoided. If I ask, why? it is disagreeable, against nature, hard to bear, woful and afflicting. XIII. Here are many words to express that by so many different forms, which we call by the single word, evil. You are defining pain, instead of removing it, when you say, it is…”
— Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 2.9 · Charles Duke Yonge translation · Open the public-domain edition
“Now I come to those brief statements of yours which you call conclusions; and first of all to that—than which, certainly, nothing can be more brief—that "everything good is praiseworthy; but everything praiseworthy is honourable; therefore everything good is honourable." Oh, what a leaden dagger!—for who will grant you your first premises? And if it should be granted to you, then you have no need of the second: for if everything good is praiseworthy, so is everything honourable; who, then, will grant you this, except Pyrrho, Aristo, and men like them?—whom you do not approve of. Aristotle, Xenocrates, and all that school, will not grant it; inasmuch as they call health, strength, riches, glory, and many other things good, but not praiseworthy; and…”
— Cicero, On Ends 4.18 · Charles Duke Yonge translation · Open the public-domain edition
“Certain of our school, however, although philosophy meant to them “the study of virtue,” and though virtue was the object sought and philosophy the seeker, have maintained nevertheless that the two cannot be sundered. For philosophy cannot exist without virtue, nor virtue without philosophy. Philosophy is the study of virtue, by means, however, of virtue itself; but neither can virtue exist without the study of itself, nor can the study of virtue exist without virtue itself. For it is not like trying to hit a target at long range, where the shooter and the object to be shot at are in different places. Nor, as roads which lead into a city, are the approaches to virtue situated outside virtue herself; the path by which one reaches virtue leads by way…”
— Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius 89.8 · Richard M. Gummere translation · Open the public-domain edition